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Morrison v. Health Plan of Nev., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 55 (July 10, 2014)1 
 
PREEMPTION: STATE COMMON LAW CLAIMS AND THE MEDICARE ACT 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined whether a Medicare beneficiary's state common law negligence 
claim against his private health insurance company, through which he is receiving his Medicare 
benefits, is preempted by the federal Medicare Act. 
 
Disposition 
 
 The Appellant’s state common law negligence claims regarding the retention and 
investigation of contracted Medicare providers are expressly preempted by the Medicare Act, 
and thus, such claims must be dismissed. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Respondent Health Care Plan of Nevada, Inc. (HPN), among others,2 is a health 
insurance business that offers medical services to Medicare beneficiaries through the 
administration of Medicare Advantage (MA) Plans. Appellant Louis Morrison received his 
Medicare benefits through HPN. Morrison became infected with hepatitis C as a result of his 
treatment from a medical care provider chosen by HPN pursuant to HPN’s insurance contract. 
Morrison alleged that HPN breached its duty to “use reasonable care to select its health care 
providers” and “to inquire into the medical practices at the clinic.” Morrison also alleged that 
HPN was negligent in directing him to seek treatment at the clinic, and that HPN knew or should 
have known that the clinic engaged in unsafe medical practices causing a high risk of 
transmission of blood-borne pathogens to patients since 2004. The district court dismissed 
Morrison’s claims with prejudice, finding the claims were preempted by the federal Medicare 
Act. Morrison then filed his appeal. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The Medicare Act "creates a federally subsidized nationwide health insurance program 
for elderly and disabled individuals.” Health care providers that provide Medicare benefits to 
patients under the Medicare Act are required to adhere to a federally regulated quality 
improvement program, which requires (1) making available to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) information on quality and outcomes measures that beneficiaries will 
use to compare health coverage options, (2) maintaining written policies and procedures for 
selecting and evaluating providers, and (3) ensuring that each physician is credentialed. CMS has 
additional requirements for relationships between such health care providers and other health 
care professionals with whom they contract to provide services. 
 
                                                 
1
  By Sean Daly. 
2
  Several “health insurance businesses” are Respondents here; however, the Court refers to them collectively as 
HPN. 
Morrison's common law negligence claim is expressly preempted by the Medicare Act 
 
 The Medicare Act has an express preemption clause which states the following: 
 
[t]he standards established under this part shall supersede any State law or 
regulation (other than State licensing laws or State laws relating to plan 
solvency) with respect to MA plans which are offered by MA 
organizations under this part.3 
  
The Court found the scope of the preemption statute very broad, finding that state laws and 
regulations that regulate health plans are unenforceable unless they pertain to licensure and/or 
solvency. When Congress explicitly conveys its intent to preempt in a statute, express 
preemption exists, and the court’s primary task becomes identifying the domain the statute 
expressly preempts. The plain language of the statute contains the best evidence of Congress’ 
preemptive intent. The Court reviews the question of whether state law claims are preempted by 
federal law de novo. 
 
 The Court has previously considered the Medicare Act preemption clause in Pacificare of 
Nevada, Inc. v. Rogers.4 In that case, the plaintiff claimed that Pacificare, her Medicare provider, 
was liable for her injuries because it neglected to employ a proper quality assurance program.5 
However, in that case the question was whether Nevada’s common law unconscionability 
doctrine was preempted by the Medicare Act, and the Court found that the Medicare Act’s 
preemption provision extended to generally applicable common law.6 The Court concluded that 
“all [s]tate standards, including those established through case law, are preempted to the extent 
they specifically would regulate MA plans.”7 
 
Federal standards exist regarding the conduct at issue in Morrison's common law negligence 
claim 
 
 Morrison argued that his claims were not preempted because there was no published 
Medicare standard that would supersede his common law negligence claim. The Court disagreed, 
stating that a state law need not be inconsistent with the federal standard to be preempted, but 
rather, there need only be a federal standard regarding the conduct at issue. 
 
 The Court held that even if Morrison was correct in this argument, his claims were still 
preempted, because federal law does provide standards that MA organizations must adhere to, 
and thus Morrison’s state law action against HPN could result in the imposition of additional 
state law requirements on the quality assurance regime regulated by CMS.8 
 
                                                 
3
  42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) (2012). 
4
  127 Nev. ___, 266 P.3d 596 (2011). 
5
  Rogers, 127 Nev. at ___, 266 P.3d at 598. 
6
  Id. at ___, 601. 
7
  Id.  
8
  For details on the specific regulations promulgated by CMS, see pages nine and ten of the opinion. 
 The dissent argued that the federal regulations cited by the Court do not immunize health 
care providers from liability and fail to address the generally applicable negligence claim 
brought by Morrison. The Court found that the dissenting opinion had mischaracterized the 
nature of Morrison’s claim, portraying it as a “negligent selection claim” when it was in fact a 
based on HPN’s failure to monitor its provider. The Court stated that a negligent quality 
assurance claim is specifically covered by the federal regulatory scheme. The Court found that 
the dissent failed to explain why the Medicare standards might preempt Nevada’s statutory 
quality assurance standards (as the dissent concedes), but would not preempt a common law 
claim based on the same conduct.  
 
The Medicare Act's preemption clause applies to claims against MA organizations 
 
 Morrison argued that the Medicare Act’s preemption provision does not apply here 
because his claim is against his MA organization, not his MA plan, and the preemption clause 
states that it only applies “with respect to MA plans.”9  
 
 The Court looked to the plain language of the provision as a whole, which states that 
"[t]he standards established under this part shall supersede any State law or regulation . . . with 
respect to MA plans which are offered by MA organizations under this part."10 The court held 
that because MA plans can only be offered by MA organizations, a claim regarding one is 
necessarily a claim regarding both. The Court also pointed out that in Rogers, the Court did not 
make any distinction between a claim brought against an MA organization and a claim brought 
against the MA plan. The Court also found that Morrison’s argument would lead to an absurd 
result, as any insured could simply name its MA organization, and not the MA plan, as the 
defendant to avoid preemption. 
 
 Morrison tried to analogize this case to Munda v. Summerlin Life & Health Insurance 
Co.,11 where the Court determined that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
did not preempt the insured’s claim that their insurer was negligent in failing to comply with 
quality assurance standards. The Court concluded that the case failed to support Morrison’s 
position because in that case, the claim was not against the insurer acting in its capacity as an 
administrator of the ERISA plan, but rather, as its independent role as an insurer.12 Therefore, the 
duty on which the claim was based existed outside of the insurer’s relationship with the ERISA 
plan.13 The Court also stated that the Medicare Act and ERISA are “fundamentally different 
programs [that] cannot be analyzed in the same way,” and that the ERISA does not have 
analogous standards regulating insurers for quality assurance.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Medicare preemption provision is very broad, as it covers “all state standards to the 
extent that they would regulate MA plans, other than laws and regulations related to licensing 
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  42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) (2012). 
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  Id.  
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  127 Nev. ___, 267 P.3d 771 (2011). 
12
  Munda, 127 Nev. at ___, 267 P.3d at 776. 
13
  Id.  
and plan solvency, including those established through case law.” Because Morrison’s state law 
negligence claim would seek to regulate how contracted providers for MA plans are monitored, 
federal law preempts it. Therefore, the district court’s order dismissing Morrison’s state common 
law negligence action was affirmed. 
 
